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ABSTRACT 
Integrated Systems Health Management (ISHh4) is a system engineering discipline 
that addresses the design, development, operation, and lifecycle management of 
components, subsystems, vehicles, and other operational systems with the purpose 
of maintaining nominal system behavior and function and assuring mission safety 
and effectiveness under off-nominal conditions. 
NASA missions are often conducted in extreme, unfamiliar environments of space, 
using unique experimental spacecraft. In these environments, off-nominal 
conditions can develop with the potential to rapidly escalate into mission- or life- 
threatening situations. Further, the high visibility of NASA missions means they 
are always characterized by extraordinary attention to safety. ISHM is a critical 
element of risk mitigation, mission safety, and mission assurance for exploration. 
ISHM enables: 
In-space maintenance and repair; 
Autonomous (and automated) launch abort and crew escape capability; 
Efficient testing and checkout of ground and flight systems; 
Monitoring and trending of ground and flight system operations and 
performance; 
Enhanced situational awareness and control for ground personnel and crew; 
Vehicle autonomy (self-sufficiency) in responding to off-nominal conditions 
during long-duration and distant exploration missions; 
Efficient ground processing of reusable systems. 
ISHM concepts and technologies may be applied to any complex engineered system 
such as transportation systems, orbital or planetary habitats, observatories, 
command and control systems, life support systems, safety-critical software, and 
even the health of flight crews. As an overarching design and operational principle 
implemented at the system-of-systems level, ISHM holds substantial promise in 
terms of affordability, safety, reliability, and effectiveness of space exploration 
missions. 
EXPLORATION MISSION CHALLENGES 
Cost, crew safety, and productivity are major challenges for exploration-class 
missions. A cursory review of NASA’s manned space program and the recent 
Design Reference Missions (DRMs) developed by NASA illustrates inherent 
conflicts between these challenges: 
Cost vs. safety: Throughout aerospace history, hardware redundancy has been 
considered a prudent risk mitigation and safety strategy. Another “traditionally 
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prudent” safety strategy is frequent inspection, overhaul, and replacement of 
mission-critical, life-limited components. Unfortunately, hardware redundancy and 
maintenance are significant contributors to escalation of total costs of ownership 
(TCO) for aerospace systems. Furthermore, the scope of exploration missions 
includes missions (e.g., long duration missions to Mars) where frequent, extensive 
maintenance operations or overhauls will not be an option. 
Safety vs. productivity: Several recent NASA DRMs (e.g., Architecture Study #1, 
OASIS, and the Mars Reference Mission) propose crew escape systems as a final 
risk mitigation strategy when redundancy is exhausted as an option. While it 
serves to preserve the critical human element of the mission, crew escape is of 
limited utility beyond Earth orbit and it equates to a mission failure. There needs to 
be other alternatives to safety and reliability that do not compromise mission 
productivity. 
Cost vs. productivity: These two goals often conflict at the design stage. The 
prototypical example of this conflict is the choice between a proven but relatively 
inefficient technology (e.g., chemical propulsion for in-space transportation) versus 
the prospect of a costly design, testing, and certification of a new, more effective 
technology (e.g., nuclear electric propulsion). 
The Joint Stnke Fighter (JSF) program has taken a revolutionary step to ease the 
conflict between cost and safety: JSF is a rare single-engine fighter jet allowed to 
operate on aircraft carriers. (The U.S. Navy traditionally prefers dual-engine aircraft 
for added safety margin on flights over water.) Furthermore, the JSF program has 
an ambitious goal of eliminating scheduled engine inspections entirely. The key to 
this bold move is Prognostic Health Management, an ISHM element focusing on 
scientific assessments of mission success probability based on health howledge of 
mission-critical life-limited components2. 
The key to resolving the inherent conflicts between safety and productivity is yet 
another ISHM element referred to as fault accommodation and recovery. One of 
the crosscutting design principles for JSF is fault accommodation, which means that 
the aircraft will be designed with sufficient margins and hardware or functional 
redundancy to “limp back to base” following an in-flight failure or battle damage. 
Another principle is fault recovery, where an aircraft or spacecraft reconfigures its 
flight controls (autonomously or through crew intervention) in order to mitigate the 
impact of an in-flight failure and continue the mission. A successful example of 
autonomous fault recovery is the Adaptive Flight Controls research conducted by 
A-mes R-esearch Center (_ARC) and Dryden Flight Research Center (DFRC) on a 
NASA C- 17, allowing the aircraft to continue flying and maneuvering even after a 
substantial portion of flight control surfaces are lost or damaged3. Finally, fault 
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protection is a method to halt the operation of a system until the problem can be 
studied and remedied. 
ISHM methods do not address design trade studies directly and as such cannot help 
resolve conflicts between affordability and effectiveness. However, 
implementation of a comprehensive ISHIvl strategy makes revolutionary 
technologies (e.g., novel propulsion systems) feasible for NASA’s exploration 
missions by increasing reliability and safety. The key is to understand the physics 
of failure in these novel systems and to design spacecraft so that all such mission- 
critical faults may be sensed well before they lead to system failures, diagnosed 
accurately, repaired in time, or accommodated without mission impact. All the base 
technologies required for this scenario are available or in development today at 
NASA or elsewhere. 
Cost control is a critical requirement for mission operations. Today, NASA 
missions are typically managed fi-om the ground and mission success depends on 
literally thousands of ground support staff including mission controllers, trainers, 
procedure writers, technicians, and maintenance personnel. Keys to reducing 
ground staffing costs include more efficient maintenance processes, increased 
automation in mission operations, and more supportable spacecraft designs; these 
are some of the benefits of a comprehensive ISHM strategy. 
SPECIFIC MISSION CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS 
In addition to the overarching strategic mission challenges, there are a number of 
specific challenges within the envisioned scope of NASA’s robotic and crewed 
exploration missions. We address a number of such challenges below and discuss 
how ISHM might play a role in addressing these challenges. 
Phased Development: Since many of the requirements 20-30 years down the road 
cannot be envisioned with certainty. However, redesigning each new generation 
from scratch is not an option. The affordability of successive generations of the 
planned Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) will largely depend on our ability to 
identify modular design elements that contribute to mission success and eliminate 
elements that increase risk and decrease overall reliability. An ISHM infrastructure 
will be critical in collecting operational data on all critical design elements and 
making design persistence determinations early on. Such data collection needs 
apply to reusable as well as expandable elements. 
Knowledge Management and Retention qf “Institutional Memoty: ” For the Apollo 
or the Space Shuttle programs, the same prime contractor workforce was retained 
throughout the program (despite the sale of Rockwell’s aerospace businesses to 
Boeing and the subsequent formation of United Space Alliance). NASA’s new 
exploration vision is envisioned to continue for several decades, and it is quite 
probable that the development contracts for successive stages will be awarded to a 
variety of prime contractors. Thus, it is essential that NASA take the initiative in 
retaining the “institutional memory” required for sustained development, including 
design trade studies, assumptions, operational information, and lessons learned. 
This is not an ISHM-specific issue; however, the capture and retention of ISHM- 
related operational information will be essential for the evolution of ISHM elements 
as the development programs mature. 
Adequate Sensing Infrastructure: In current spacecraft designs, sensor selection and 
installation is typically guided by the needs of control avionics. Due to cost, 
reliability, and complexity constraints, systems are often designed with the minimal 
complement of sensors necessary to accomplish control and fault detection, 
isolation, and recovery (FDIR) requirements. Such sensor selection processes often 
result in inadequate sensing for health management purposes, limiting health 
management to only those sensors that were already designed into the system for 
control purposes. As a result, it is often impossible to detect and isolate signals 
(e.g., vibration data from individual components) that relate to in-flight component 
failure. Furthermore, there is often very little sensor information on spacecraft 
structural components and thermal protection systems (lack of sensor coverage on 
the Space Shuttle thermal protection system was extensively discussed subsequent 
to the Columbia accident). 
Data Glut: Even with relatively modest telemetry streams, the Space Shuttle and 
International Space Station programs overwhelm mission controllers with telemetry 
data. The same goes for robotic spacecraft - for example, it is expected that the 
data collected by the Deep Impact spacecraft during its brief encounter with an 
asteroid will take years to analyze. Our existing data monitoring and analysis 
methods are not scalable to next-generation vehicles that will have substantially 
larger sensor suites. Thus, we need to develop effective methods for onboard data 
compression, data interpretation, and summarization. Furthermore, we need to 
automate methods to derive useful operational knowledge from data (such as the 
safe operating margins or fault progression characteristics of a certain component). 
The data mining and intelligent data understanding methods critical to the success 
of hture missions are significant elements of a comprehensive ISHM strategy. 
Logistics and Maintenance for Long-Duration Crewed Missions: Although NASA 
develops exceptionally reliable space systems, all materials, structures, and 
electronics eventually do fail. This is often the result of a slow fault progression 
over a long period. Material imperfections and weaknesses (e.g., cracks, fatigue, 
etc.) may begin early in the operational life of a component, often at microscopic 
levels. As operational loads (e.g., thermal, vibration, acceleration, etc.) continue to 
stress the material, incipient faults appear. Eventually, damage patterns develop 
with overt manifestations that can be identified with signal detection and fault 
isolation technology. ISHM provides the prognostic framework by which incipient 
faults can be detected before they progress to the point of failure, triggering 
condition-based maintenance actions or fault accommodatiodrecovery 
mechanisms. Design of transportation systems for maintainability by crews during 
flight (or during surface operations) should be an overarching design and 
engineering principle for future exploration missions. 
Software Health: Traditionally, health management efforts often focus on 
propulsion systems or other mechanical vehicle subsystems. An increasing trend in 
engineering systems is software complexity accompanied by software faults. In 
recent years, two missions to Mars (Mars Polar Lander and Mars Climate Orbiter) 
ended in failures caused by software design flaws, and the MER Spirit Rover was 
almost disabled by another software flaw which, fortunately, was diagnosed and 
repaired by humans hundreds of millions of miles away. The trend is disturbing: 
Average software flaw densities remain approximately constant (0.5 flaws per 
thousand lines of commercial software code, according to Reasoning, Inc.) while 
the number of lines of code in each new generation of spacecraft increases 
drastically. The only way to reverse the onslaught of software flaws is through 
emerging software health management technologies such as verification and 
validation, model checking, static analysis, and automated software generation. 
Software Certfication: Avionics software for human-rated space flight goes 
through an extensive certification process that requires verification and validation 
of every execution path in the software, including every possible command input 
and possible range of state variables. This is an expensive and complex task for 
even the simplest avionics software code. True ISHM requires large-scale models 
of the spacecraft and the environment it interacts with. Furthermore, these models 
are executed on "inference engines" that can cover a vast number of possible states 
and state transitions. Cost-effective verification and validation of large models and 
complex inference engines is an open issue. Thus, deployment of complex ISHM 
software is llkely to run into cost and complexity barriers with respect to 
certification. 
IMPLEMENTATION APPROACH 
Although several health management elements have been deployed in flight 
demonstrations and actual missions, system-wide integration of health management 
technologies is a brand new frontier for NASA. Until the value of the ISHM 
practice is firmly established, investments need to be made selectively and the 
return on investment (ROI) assessed rigorously. This is where system engineering 
plays a critical role. Health management hardware (processors, sensors, wiring, etc.) 
and software must be incorporated selectively and optimally into a new platform to 
provide maximum benefits at a minimum cost. 
NASA's past efforts in spacecraft autonomy as well as vehicle health management 
have shown that optimal system designs result when structured design techniques 
are utilized starting with the conceptual design phase and throughout the 
development and testing phases. $us, certain investments must be made upfront to 
lay the groundwork for advanced exploration missions. Such upfront ISHM 
investments include standards-based implementation, design for diagnosability and 
testability, and a robust sensor infrastructure (even if all the downstream data 
processing and information management architecture is not implemented at once). 
The initial CEV design should include mature ISHM methods and technologies to 
contain the technology risk and to demonstrate ROI on “low-hanging h i t . ”  
Candidate methods and technologies for early deployment include propulsion 
monitoring, caution and warning systems with root cause identification capability, 
rapid-acting propulsion safing and crew escape technologies, and onboard data 
analysis and reduction methods. The initial design should also lay the groundwork 
for a comprehensive prognostics infrastructure on flight-critical hardware. 
Operational data should be collected via the prognostics infrastructure during all 
test firings, test flights, and actual missions. During the life span of the initial CEV, 
physics-based and data-driven prognostic models should be developed for major 
flight-critical life-limited components, and model predictions should be compared 
to inspection findings. Finally, the knowledge management and retention 
infrastructure should be established upfront. 
The CEV for lunar exploration should incorporate lessons learned fiom the CEV 
designed for earlier orbital missions (mainly in the areas of prognostics). Candidate 
technologies and practices include advanced diagnostics for a larger set of 
subsystems and more sophisticated human-system interfaces such as sophisticated 
fault identification and management interfaces. We can also expect moderate 
improvements in maintenance practices based on limited prognostics and more 
advanced automated recovery capabilities for spacecraft. Robotic craft introduced 
for lunar exploration should have more sophisticated autonomous navigation 
capabilities and exhibit limited goal-directed behavior. Finally, a human outpost on 
the moon will require significant investments in structural health for the habitat and 
other crew shelters. 
Looking forward toward Mars exploration, we can anticipate a filly-integrated 
systems health management architecture. This architecture would cover all 
subsystems of the craft and integrate information fkom these systems into an 
autonomous mission management capability. Exchange of control authority 
between crew and systems would be seamless and accomplished as mission 
demands dictate, and mission command duties would be largely limited to oversight 
of systems (not unlike the duties of commercial air transport crews today). “Fault 
protection” would yield to “fault anticipation” as accurate prognostic models 
become available for all mission-critical life-limited components. Significant 
savings in maintenance will be coupled with increased availability of system-of- 
systems elements. Robotic craft will be goal-directed and able to conduct 
autonomous science missions with limited human oversight. Self-sustaining robotic 
“ecologies” will become a reality in later spirals. 
CONCLUSION 
Literally all systems in a system-of-systems fiamework are potentially impacted by 
ISHM investments: 
? 
For example, ISHM will impact the affordability of an entire system-of- 
systems by reducing the need for hardware redundancy (and thus reducing 
.“ 
system acquisition as well as launch costs) and by allowing maintenance 
policies to be driven by scientific observations rather than “fear of failure.” 
A broad ISHM implementation will impact the overall reliability and safety 
of an entire space transportation and exploration system by ensuring the 
health and continued effectiveness of all its constituent systems. 
Finally, investments in ISHM will increase the productivity of the entire 
system-of-systems by increasing mission availability across the board. 
As with many other non-traditional concepts, ISHM will have to buy its way into 
exploration missions with demonstrated success and return on investment. Staged 
development and implementation of ISHM over the CEV lifecycle is a safe, 
effective, and affordable way to implement a crosscutting ISHM strategy for 
exploration. 
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